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Whistle Blowing Disclosure: Evidence from Emerging Market 
Abstract: This article investigates factors which drive firms to disclose whistle blowing policies, 
especially when disclosing such policies is not mandatory by law in one of the emerging markets 
i.e. India. Results suggest that firms which have high promoters’ shareholding display whistle 
blowing policies to lesser extent. Furthermore, variation in disclosure of policies is positively 
and significantly related to percentage of independent directors and creation of special positions 
like chief ethical officer or ethical counselor. We analyzed 200 Bombay stock exchange listed 
firms in India to conduct the study. 
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With advent of liberalization, privatization and globalization, corporate India has gained 
worldwide popularity. Unfortunately, where Indian firms have grown aggressively, crossing 
national borders, the unethical conduct of firms has also been on rise. Satyam collapse, which is 
more commonly known as collapse of Indian Enron (Economist, 2009) followed by fraudulent 
act of one of the most reputed pharmaceutical company in India i.e. Ranbaxy, has given shocking 
waves across the globe. Undoubtedly, whistle blowing is one of the most effective mechanisms 
to combat corporate fraud (ACFE, 2010). Unfortunately, Indian governance law unlike Sarbanes 
Oxley act, does not makes it mandatory for firms to implement whistle blowing policy and if 
firms do so, it is completely voluntarily. Clause 49 of SEBI merely states “listed firms may have 
whistle blowing policy”. Thus, it is mere a recommendation and not mandating. Ernst and Young 
survey shows that most employees are aware of the fraudulent acts going in the company but 
they don’t blow whistle as they are not sure about their protection (Kaplan et. al, 2010). Thus it 
is vital that firms have formal whistle blowing procedures and systems in place. Fraudulent 
activities are less in firms which have effective policies and practices in place (Calderon-
Cuadrado et al, 2009). Since, it is not mandatory by law, firms in India differ from one another in 
terms of having effective whistle blowing practices. Unlike firms in developed countries, each 
Indian firm differ in the aspect of who frames whistle blowing policy, who reports to whom in 
terms of detecting the fraud and what type of security measures would be provided to the 
employee and if at all, those safety measures would be provided. Various firm level factors 
would influence the level and quality of internal reporting and seriousness of whistle blowing 
policy. Generally firms’ whistle blowing policy and code of ethics goes hand in hand (Brown, 
2009). Yet overall, there is inconsistencies and variation in the effectiveness of whistle blowing 
policies in the Indian firms.  This makes it vital to investigate as to what drives Indian firms to 
frame whistle blowing policy, which could help in stopping fraudulent activities in initial stages 
itself. 
We focus on those cross-sectional firm level traits, which could influence corporate disclosure 
policy regarding whistle blowing. We focus on three such firm level traits to test our model. First 
is level of promoters’ shareholding. Indian business environment is peculiar as it is not only run 
by mainly promoters and family members but also they have major shareholding exceeding 50% 
many a times, unlike family business in other countries. This aspect may particularly influence 
framing of policies which can make fraud reporting easier. Second factor that we focus on, is 
percentage of independent directors. Independent directors are the most vital aspect of framing 
corporate governance disclosure policies; hence we expect them to play a significant role in 
framing whistle blowing policy as well. Our third determinant is whether a person holds a 
designated position in the organization to look after ethical activities of the firm. This could be 
Chief Ethical Officer or Chief compliance officer. This is because, when employees hold such 
positions, they are duty bound to look after ethical disclosure activities, which could then raise 
chances of framing explicit whistle blowing policies.  We find that firms’ shareholding pattern, 
number of independent and special positions, influence the effectiveness of whistle blowing 
policy.  
This article contributes to the field of corporate governance and business ethics by identifying 
factors which would influence use of whistle blowing systems and policies by the company. 
Although in developed countries, this aspect is mandated by law, in emerging markets like India, 
firms may voluntarily abide by this recommendation. We specifically focus on firm level factors 
which drives good whistle blowing disclosure policies. Although firm level factors have been 
investigated with respect to whistle blowing policy (Lee and Fargher, 2013), role of promoters, 
independent directors and special positions have not been investigated. Given the weak 
institutional context of emerging markets (Khanna and Palepu, 2000), these aspects becomes 
vital to be investigated. 
The article is organized as follows: We first list prior research in the field of whistle blowing. 
Next we develop the model and state the hypothesis. This is followed by data and methodology 
section and finally we present results and conclusions.  
 
Theory and Hypothesis 
Many aspects of whistle blowing have been investigated in recent past. The issues ranged from 
characteristics of whistle blowers to consequences of whistle blowing (Bowen et. al, 2010; Dyck 
et. al, 2010; Miceli et. al, 2008). We focus on characteristics of organizations and how they 
impact effectiveness of whistle blowing policy. 
Although, whistle blowing has been defined in literature in many ways (Jubb, 1999), the most 
commonly accepted definition is “the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of 
illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or 
organizations that may be able to effect action (Near and Miceli 1985, p. 4). If implemented 
appropriately, whistle blowing policy can help in timely detection of fraud, correct the 
wrongdoing before it gets too late and furthermore, minimize the loss and cost incurred due to 
fraud (Chung et. al, 2004). Companies by having strong and strict internal reporting mechanisms 
can also avoid dent in their reputation if such frauds are publicized due to ineffective fraudulent 
detecting mechanisms within the organizations. It has been found that companies do differ in the 
transparency and depth of disclosure of their code of conduct and whistle blowing policy (Singh 
et. al, 2005; Hassink et. al, 2007). Hassink for example, investigated top 56 European firms and 
found that most firms encouraged employees to report breach of code of conduct or policies or 
law or regulations. Although companies did not disclosed how whistle blowers would be treated 




Factors affecting whistle blowing policy disclosures 
Extant studies have shown that reporting intentions of employees increases when firms have 
appropriate code of conduct and ethical policies in place (Schwartz, 2001). Somers (2001) 
reported that firms with ethical codes and policies in place experienced less wrong doings. 
Barnett et al (1993) on the other hand found that employees disclosed more wrong doings when 
transparent and explicit code of conduct and internal policies were in place. Employees also felt 
that they behaved more ethically apart from reporting misconducts when organizations had 
explicit and transparent disclosure policies (Adams et. al, 2001). In general, frequency and extent 
of whistle blowing by employees depends on the level of transparency and explicitness of the 
whistle blowing policy laid down by firms. Given that it is not mandatory for Indian firms to lay 
down such policies, it is vital to investigate characteristics of firms which drive them to frame 
such policies. Extant literature has focused on macro environmental variables like legal 
environment and economic environment of the firm like size and capital intensity of the firm, to 
explain variation in quality of disclosure policy (Clarkson et. al, 2006; Holderweb et. al, 2008; 
Lee and Fargher, 2013). Amongst macro environmental factors, national culture of the country is 
most studied and requires special description. National culture plays a significant role in 
formulation of whistle blowing policies in a country. Generally culture enables individuals to 
interpret the world (Chiu and Hong, 2007). Culture implies shared way of thinking by a 
particular community, which then influences individuals’ value and important decisions (Nolan, 
2002). Several empirical investigations have examined impact of national culture on whistle 
blowing. For example, amongst cross cultural studies it has been found that French executives 
were less interested in reporting questionable acts compared to Norway and US executives 
(Schultz et. al, 1993). Similarly Patel (2003) also reported that Australian executives were more 
likely to involve in whistle blowing compared to Indian Counterparts. This happened as whistle 
blowing was more active in countries with individualistic societies. Thus, in USA and Australia 
the phenomenon was more prevalent. Miceli et. al (2008) also suggested that whistle blowing is 
going to be less active in collectivist societies. On Hofstede dimensions, India is a collectivistic 
country (Chadda, 2013). This is also one of the reasons as to why whistle blowing is weak in 
India. 
The most peculiar trait of Indian business system is existence of business groups and family 
owned business. Even today, majority of the shares of listed companies are owned by family 
members. Although, in India as the latest survey shows that seven out of ten best performing 
stocks are those of family owned firms, yet family owned firms have shown around 5% erosion 
in the market capitalization compared to professionally managed firms, where a firm does not 
has a dominant single shareholder (Business Standard, 2013). For example, Shareholders of 
Reliance Industries lost 40% in last five years, whereas ITC (Indian Tobacco Company, a 
professionally managed firm) reported a growth of more than 200% in its stock price.  Similarly, 
minority shareholders were found to be more respected in professionally managed firms by 
virtue of having appropriate corporate governance code. Due to these peculiar features, 
professionalism and focus on shareholders’ wealth still lacks amongst in majority of  Indian 
corporate, and consequently, the firms shows least interest in framing whistle blowing policies. 
In the case of Ranbaxy, the founders had the maximum shareholding and whistle blowers had to 
report to external agencies rather to stop the fraud in the organization. In India, corporate law is 
weak resulting in institutional voids (Khanna and Palepu, 2000), hence less transparent practices. 
Thus, when legal framework is not at place, encouragement of whistle blowing can be least 
expected. This is one of the reasons why, instances of whistle blowing have been few in India. 
Hardly two-three cases has been notified in the past few years. This is not the case with 
multinational companies. They have clear rules and policies describing how cases should be 
reported and handled.  
We thus discuss role of family owned business, nature of independent directors and existence of 
special positions to explain variation in quality of disclosure of whistle blowing policy. 
Independent directors are generally associated with good governance practices (Kampbel, 2012). 
Thus, they would ensure that effective whistle blowing policies are in place. If firms are really 
committed towards reporting of fraudulent activities, then for day to day concerns and reports of 
employees they would hire special officers like Ombudsperson or Chief Ethical Officer who 
would ensure ethical compliances of business practices. Person holding such position would then 
encourage fraudulent reporting by explicitly laying the policies regarding whistle blowing. Given 
the significance of these drivers for fraudulent reporting we now proceed towards hypothesis 
development. 
 High Promoter Shareholding 
Terms like promoter controlling, ownership concentration, founding family control have been 
interchangibily used in the literature. Broadly, all these terms refer to firms, where family 
members or their relatives have significant stake in the company (McConaughy et. al, 1998). In 
economies, where corporate ownership is highly concentrated in the hands of promoters of a 
firm, minority investors interests are only weekly protected (Classsens et. al, 2000). Rather few 
studies also reflect that as corporate ownership concentration increases, strength of corporate 
governance practices weakens (Yen and Andre, 2007). For example, promoters may take out 
assets and profits out of the firm commonly referred to as tunneling effect), to invest in loss 
making firms, affiliated with same promoter (Claessens et. al, 2006; George and Kabir, 2008), 
rather than using them in the interest of minority shareholders (Chakrabarti et. al, 2008). 
Similarly, they may manipulate earnings accruals as well (Kim and Yi, 2010). Furthermore, level 
of disclosure and transparency in reporting practices is also less, as promoters prefer to keep 
minorities in dark (Aksu and Kosedag, 2006) and even level of public announcements is low 
(Laidroo, 2009). Whistle Blowing represents one of the mechanisms through which good 
corporate governance practices can be enforced (Rachagan and Kalaithasan, 2013). Also it 
discloses wrong doings of the company to broader segment of stakeholders, something which 
family firms or firms with high promoter shareholding will not prefer. Corporate governance 
mechanisms like whistle blowing enhances managements’ accountability towards shareholders 
(Bear et. al, 2010). But when family members hold majority stake, they become answerable to 
only minority investors. Thus, they do not prefer to have policies like whistle blowing which 
makes them answerable to minority shareholders and hence have poor formulation and 
implementation of such policies (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013).  
This kind of dominant shareholding also leads to deterioration in professional management of the 
organization (Stewart and Hitt, 2012), as promoters tend to employee their close relatives and 
friends in the organization, indulge in political activities and thus destroy work culture and also 
welfare of the external shareholders (Hadani, 2007; Kimber and Lipton, 2005; Martin and Sanz, 
2006). Furthermore, in highly ownership concentrated organizations, most of the times senior 
management themselves would be involved in unfair activities. For examples, because of 
majority stake they themselves would appoint board members, sell products at below market 
price, to their own sister concerns. Family firms firstly would never like voice to be raised in 
these matters, and even if employee raises voice, hearing can be least expected as even board 
members are elected by family members. Thus, policies like whistle blowing would not be 
formulated in firms with high promoter shareholding. Though in emerging markets like India, 
corporate governance policies are made to protect interest of minority shareholders, they have 
been found to be least effective (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). Gibson (2003) also reported that 
emerging market firms, which generally also suffer from institutional voids have poor 
governance practices in family owned firms. As far as whistle blowing is concerned, SEBI did 
not mandated firms to formulate this policy and since blowing whistle, could highlight faulty 
practices in organizations, which may have adverse impact on customers and shareholders, this 
vital component of corporate governance is hardly implemented in emerging markets like 
(Hinde, 1997) In terms of transparency of corporate governance practices as well, it has been 
found that business group affiliated firms in India are less transparent compared to stand alone 
firms (Kuan et. al, 2011; Pattnaik et. al, 2011). Thus, one could not expect better transparency for 
whistle blowing. Probably, these are the reasons why market valuation of firms with high 
promoter shareholding is low (Lien and Li, 2013; Pant and Patnaik, 2007; Selarka, 2005; Singh 
and Gaur, 2009). Although, family ownership of business is prevalent in developed economies as 
well, weak institutional environment, makes this issue more challenging in emerging markets 
like India (Peng and Jiang, 2009; Yang and Su, 2013). We thus hypothesize: 
 




Board of directors 
 
Boards of directors are appointed by shareholders. It has been found that when politicians hire 
regulators, they are often under pressure to ignore whistle blowing in the cases which pertains to 
the wrong doing of politicians (Nielson, 2013). Similarly, if promoters by virtue of having 
majority shareholding appoint board of directors, then directors may often oversee the whistle 
blowing policy, as they act as agents not on behalf of shareholders but promoters themselves. 
Thus, directors by virtue of having social ties with promoters might work under their influence 
(Hoitash, 2010). Yet independent directors, unlike executive directors, demand more objectivity 
and depth in the availability of management control information and their information seeking 
behavior is more productive as well (Reheual and Jorissen, 2010). Since independent directors 
largely depend upon Management Information Systems reports and other information provided 
by the staff to make effective monitoring and advisory decisions, they encourage employees to 
report fraudulent activities within the organization. For this they enforce explicit statements of 
whistle blowing policy. Furthermore, management due its focus on day to day functioning and 
profit earning focus would abide by law only to the minimal extent possible. Independent board 
of directors would drive such voluntary activities of disclosure to a large extent (Kampel, 2012). 
Furthermore, it has been seen that firms with large percentage of independent directors have 
more ethical programs compared to counterparts (Felo, 2001). Since whistle blowing is also one 
of the ethical components, we can predict that independent directors would promote explicit 
description of policy. Thus, overall independent directors would call for more disclosure, also 
leading to overall enhancement in market value of the firm (Eng and Mak, 2005), especially in 
emerging markets (Filatotchev et. al, 2005; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Sarkar and Sarkar, 2003).. 
Hence, we hypothesize 
 
H2: Whistle blowing policy disclosure is positively and significantly associated with percentage 
of independent directors on board 
 
Special Positions 
The term “ethics officer” (EO) refers to the person who is responsible for overseeing company’s’ 
operations, its compliance and business conduct efforts in ethical manner. Chief Ethical Officer 
is generally appointed at vice president and senior vice president level. Apart from overseeing 
ethical activities, person holding this designation is generally also responsible for general 
administration and human resource management activities (Hoffman and Rowe, 2007). Firms 
which are genuinely concerned about ethical aspects of business, not only employs ethical or 
compliance officer but also empowers them. Person holding special position can then ensure 
framing and implementation of appropriate policies, as a part and parcel of its job. Furthermore, 
hiring of Ethical officers also signals that firm uses dedicated channels to report mis-conduct, 
consequently employees are also motivated to report the fraud. Thus, dedicated personal for this 
job not only drive explicit and in depth framing of disclosure policy but also ensure its 
independent evaluation when fraud is detected (Sumanshi, 2012). We thus hypothesize: 
 
H3 Hiring of dedicated personal for ethics, is positively and significantly associated with 
disclosure of whistle blowing policy 
  
Data and Methods 
We selected top 200 Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) listed firms of India. BSE is the national 
stock exchange of India and is equivalent to NASDAQ of USA. We assessed the quality of 
whistle blowing policies in corporate based on the extent to which guidelines provided by SEBI 
(Indian equivalent of SEC) in Clause 49 was followed by the firms. The checklist along with 
percentage of companies complying with that checklist is provided in Table 1. The checklist had 
7 disclosure items. For example, according to the recommendations of SEBI, the existence of the 
whistle blowing mechanisms should be appropriately communicated to employees by virtue of 
internal circulars etc. hence we have included that item in the check list. Similarly, the 
recommendation outlined the need of providing adequate safeguard to the employees who openly 
disclose the fraud, so we have incorporated that item as well in the checklist. It should be noted 
that compared to global standards, Indian firms have comparatively lesser interest for reasons 
explained above. Furthermore, the disclosure norms by SEBI in India consist of only 7 items, 
compared to several items of other countries. For example, Australian Council recommends 18 
items of whistle blowing policies like informing the whistle blower on commencement of 
investigation, its progress and its outcome. However, such norms are absent in India. Similarly, 
US legislation makes it mandatory for companies to establish sound whistle blowing policies. In 
USA also the onus of implementing whistle blowing policies lies in the hands of audit 
committee. Further, US legislation like Indian recommendation legislation provides protection to 
whistle blowers, but in addition to protection, it also provides incentives to encourage whistle 
blowingi. 
We searched code of conduct, corporate governance section of the annual reports and various 
other sections of the website of the selected firms to analyze if the recommendations given by 
SEBI were adopted or not adopted by the firm. For example, we found that sometimes whistle 
blowing policies were given in the career section of the website. Ranbaxy is one such company. 
Thus, if the checklist item was present in the annual report or ethical conduct policy of the firm, 
or any other section of website, we coded it as 1, else 0. Since, this required content analysis, we 
used inter-coder reliability to check if items have been ticked appropriately. For this purpose, 
20% of the firms were coded by two coders independently and the reliability exceeded 90%. We 
did not assign any weights to the items in checklist and calculated the total score of the quality of 
disclosure by simply adding up all the disclosures made. So the minimum score that a company 
could get was zero and the maximum score was 7. More the score better was the disclosure 
policy of the firm. This frequency distribution gives a rough estimate of standard and quality of 
disclosure offered by listed companies in India.  
Operationalization of independent variables 
Promoters Shareholding: Information on this construct was obtained from Prowess, a Centre of 
Monitoring of Indian Economy (CMIE) database.  
Percentage of Independent Directors: Information on independent directors was obtained from 
“Directors database”. This database was created as an initiative of BSE by Prime Database of 
India.  
Special Position: We searched for special position of Ethics officer on company’s’ web site and 
annual reports. Various terms like Ethical Counselor, Ombudsperson, and Chief Ethical Officer 
etc. were found to be associated with this position. We again conducted content analysis on 20% 
of the sample firms and found reliability exceeding 95%. 
Control Variables 
Following the approach of Lee and Fargher, 2013, we controlled for size of the firm, levels of 
inventory and Geographic dispersion. We used Return on Assets to control for size of the firm. 
Geographic Dispersion, was measured as export intensity i.e. Exports to sales ratio. Information 
on the three variables was again obtained from Prowess, a CMIE database. Internal control risk 
is high in large sized firms, having high inventory. Thus, chances of mis-reporting and fraudulent 
activities could be more. Thus, it was vital to control for size and levels of inventory. 
Furthermore, in geographically dispersed firms internal monitoring becomes even more difficult; 
consequently the significance of whistle blowing could even become more, if a firm wants to 
obtain correct information reports. We thus controlled for the three variables. 
Results 
Table 2 gives descriptive statistics for the sample in terms of mean, median, minimum and 
maximum value. The mean whistle blowing score is 2.5 and median is 3. Thus the overall 
disclosure scores is not even average, implying that most firms are not following 
recommendations made by SEBI and formulation of policies is only at surface level, as it is not 
mandated by law. Average promoter shareholding in Indian companies is highly dominant with 
50.1% as the average holding. Table 3 gives correlation statistics. Disclosure scores are found to 
be significantly and negatively correlated with % of Promoter shareholding.  
 
Tobit Regression Analysis 
 
As the whistle blowing scores vary between two limits, we use Tobit Regression instead of 
multiple linear regressions.  Results of the analysis are presented in Table 4. Pseudo R2 is 0.125, 
with control variables. We enter our independent variables in step 2 and find that Pseudo R2 
value rises to 0.28. All of the independent variables were found to be significant in the model. 
Our first hypothesis stated that promoters’ holding is significantly and negatively associated with 
whistle blowing disclosure policy. We find evidence in support of this hypothesis (β =- 0.385, 
p<0.01). According to second hypothesis, proportion of independent directors is positively and 
significantly associated with disclosure policy. Since beta coefficient is significant at 5% (β 
=0.25), we find evidence in support of second hypothesis as well. Similarly, significance of beta 
coefficient of special ethical officer position at 5% indicates that, when special ethical officers 
are appointed, transparent disclosure of policy also increases (β =3.15).  
 
Sensitivity analysis of disclosure scores 
 
We used an alternative approach of measuring disclosure scores. According to this approach, we 
classified scores as high and low score, based on median disclosure score, which was 3 in this 
case. We thus coded scores above 3 as one, indicating high disclosure scores and coded scores 
below 3 as zero, indicating low disclosure scores. All the beta coefficients remained significant 
and their value especially for board of directors increased to a certain extent. Earlier beta 
coefficient for proportion of independent directors was 0.25, which rose to 0.46. Similarly, 
promoter sharing holding impact also rose to -0.501.  
 Conclusion 
In this paper we discussed the level and quality of disclosures in whistle blowing policy. For 
effective implementation and to encourage employees to blow whistle it is vital that norms and 
codes of whistle blowing are clearly and explicitly laid down. Though mere clarity of statements 
would not automatically ensure effective implementation of the policy, yet it is a precursor of the 
same (Barnett et. al, 1993). We focused on those typical characteristics of Indian Business, 
which makes it unique and creates barriers to effective corporate governance. These 
characteristics were dominant shareholding by family members, lesser number of independent 
directors and independent authority responsible for taking action against frauds. We found that 
disclosure was less when promoters’ holding was high in the organization, i.e. it was 
significantly but negatively associated with promoters’ holding in the organization. Similarly, 
disclosure policy was positively and significantly associated with percentage of independent 
directors. Furthermore, when reporting authority for whistle blowing was supervisor or some 
other senior in management, then disclosure was less, compared to when special position was 
created to look after this issue. Broadly, our study suggests that corporate governance 
environment of a firm influences the quality of policy making and implementation regarding 
whistle blowing. Lesser the concentrated shareholding of promoters in the organization, more 
explicit and detailed is the framing of whistle blowing policy. Good corporate governance 
environment however is only the necessary but not sufficient condition for effective 
implementation of whistle blowing policy.  
Limitations of the study 
 
We have taken sample of listed firms only, thus the determinants of whistle blowing policy 
disclosure cannot be generalized to private and unlisted firms. Furthermore, the results cannot be 
generalized in the context of developed countries as well. This is because; first the depth of 
recommendations made by SEC and other such authorities is vast compared to emerging markets 
like India. For example, in Australia itself, legislation requires companies to disclose whistle 
blowing policy on 18 aspects, whereas in case of India it is only 7. Thus, our determinants work 
well in the weak institutional context. Secondly, although family business dominates developed 
countries also, but the extent of dominant shareholding is far less compared to India, where it 
almost touches 50% on an average. Furthermore, our determinants only highlight effective 
formulation of the policy and not its implementation. Although transparent whistle blowing 
policy is vital for effective implementation of the policy, it is just one of the antecedents of 
effective implementation and other factors could also play vital role.  
 
Directions of future research 
 
Representation of disclosure policy could be an eye wash if it is not implemented properly 
(Hassink et. al, 2007). Policy is credible only if its implementation is visible. Dedicated hotline 
service is a signal of firms’ effective implementation of whistle blowing policy (Lee and 
Fargher, 2011). This reflects management’s seriousness and commitment towards detecting 
fraudulent activities in the company using whistle blowing. Usage of hotlines, is a signal of 
managements’ commitment and seriousness towards whistle blowing policy for two reasons. 
First, establishing a hotline is an expensive affair and management would not incur cost into it, if 
it is not serious about such policy. Future research can focus on determinants of effective 
implementation of whistle blowing policy. 
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Table 1 Disclosure items as recommended by SEBI and % of times those disclosures are made 
by companies 
Disclosure items % of times 
disclosed (n = 
200) 
Personnel who observe an unethical or improper practice (not necessarily a 
violation of law) shall be able to approach the audit committee without 
necessarily informing their supervisors. 
34.6 
  
Companies shall take measures to ensure that this right of access is 
communicated to all employees through means of internal circulars, etc. 
59.1 
  
The employment and other personnel policies of the company shall contain 
provisions protecting "whistle blowers" from unfair termination and other 
unfair prejudicial employment practices. 
76.8 
  
Company shall annually affirm that it has not denied any personnel access to 




Such affirmation shall form a part of the Board report on Corporate 




The mechanism must also provide, where senior management is involved, 24.3 
  
Source: http://www.sebi.gov.in/commreport/clause49.html 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean S.D Median Minimum Maximum 
Whistle Blowing Score 2.5 0.98 3 1 5 
Promoter shareholding 50.1 10.2 51 18 65 
% of independent 
director 49.8 13.1 40 0.31 0.74 
Special Position 0.384 0.52 0 0 1 
ROA 0.192 2.1 0.07 -7.1 20.1 
Inventory/ Sales 10.125 6.01 14.5 0 22.87 
Export/ Sales 11.44 7.25 12.01 4.89 23.56 
 
 
Table 3 Correlation Matrix 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.Whistle Blowing 
score 1 
      2 Promoter 
shareholding -0.45*** 1 
     3. % of independent 
directors 0.371*** 0.105 1 
    4. special position 0.25** -0.162* 0.121 1 
   5. ROA 0.115 0.107 0.14* 0.072 1 
   Inven/Sales 0.132* 0.12 0.082 0.115 0.131* 1 
 7. Export/ Sales 0.106 0.105 0.109 0.064 0.098 0.114 1 
        
direct access to the Chairman of the Audit Committee. 
  
 
Audit Committee periodically reviews existence and functioning of 
mechanisms  
18.07 
 Table 4 Tobit Regression Results 
 












ROA 0.015 0.01 0.016 0.02 
Invent/ Sales 0.24 0.19 0.24 0.18 
Export/ sales 0.26** 0.17 0.25** 0.16 
-2Log likelihood 235.25 
 
279.75 


















                                                                         Appendix A 
i. Personnel who observe an unethical or improper practice (not necessarily a violation of 
law) shall be able to approach the audit committee without necessarily informing their 
supervisors.  
The policy recommended by SEBI regarding whistle blowing highlights that employees 
should be allowed to directly access audit committee members.  
ii. Companies shall take measures to ensure that this right of access is communicated to all 
employees through means of internal circulars, etc.  
SEBI guideline further indicate that mere existence of policies in companies is not sufficient, 
they should be communicated as well to employees through means like internal circulars. 
This is vital because if employees are not aware about such policies, they won’t be able to 
raise voice against faulty acts in the company. 
iii. The employment and other personnel policies of the company shall contain provisions 
protecting "whistle blowers" from unfair termination and other unfair prejudicial 
employment practices.  
Further SEBI recommends that to raise the confidence in the policy and procedure, it is vital 
that unfair unemployment practices are not endorsed by the company. For this it is vital that 
whistle blowing policies assures no unfair treatment of employees, when they blow whistles. 
Hence, recommendation of above mentioned policy. 
  
iv. Company shall annually affirm that it has not denied any personnel access to the audit 
committee of the company (in respect of matters involving alleged misconduct).  
Next SEBI recommends that an employee should not be denied access to audit committee even if 
employee does not have proof for misconduct. This is because; committee members when 
informed of misconduct can search for evidences. The onus of producing evidences should not 
be in hands of employees as in many cases, junior employees may not have sufficient proof but 
can only guide about misconduct. 
 
v. Such affirmation shall form a part of the Board report on Corporate Governance that is 
required to be prepared and submitted together with the annual report. 
Since, whistle blowing is a corporate governance issue, SEBI recommends that it should be 
present in corporate governance report and hence should     ultimately reach investors as well 
through annual reports. 
  
   vi The mechanism must also provide, where senior management is involved, direct access to 
the Chairman of the Audit Committee.  
Senior management may have some influence over the audit committee members. That is why in 
cases where senior management is involved in fraud, SEBI recommends that employee should 
have direct access to Chairman of Audit committee, instead of only committee members.  
  Vii The Audit Committee must periodically review the existence and functioning of the 
mechanism. 
Based on the problems faced in reporting or following up the whistle blowers and defaulters, 
SEBI suggests that firms should periodically review and update their policies. External factors 




                                                          
i http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whistleblower#United_States 
 
